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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since Mexico's near default on its external debt in mid-
1982, the international banking arena has taken on the appearance
of a de facto bankruptcy court. Many third world nations, faced
with lagging economies and steadily rising debts, teeter on the
brink of default. Large scale reorganization and refinancing appear
to be the only reasonable solutions.
In the recent case of Allied Bank International v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago,1 (Allied Bank I1) the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit added a significant legal dimension
to this economic comparison. In its original decision (Allied Bank
I), the appellate court refused to enforce the contractual rights of
an American bank against defaulting Costa Rican borrowers on
grounds of international comity.2 The court cited by analogy to
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code of 1978.' In effect, the
court attempted to force the plaintiff bank to accept the terms of
an agreement that restructured the Costa Rican external debt.
The Second Circuit subsequently vacated its own decision on
rehearing (Allied Bank II). 4 The court's decision was based on the
arguments contained in the amicus brief filed by the U.S. Depart-
1. No. 83-7714 slip op. (2d Cir. April 23, 1984), rev'd on rehearing, 757 F.2d 516 (2d
Cir. 1985).
2. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
3. Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714 slip op.
4. 757 F.2d at 518.
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ment of Justice. Nevertheless, the court's rationale in Allied Bank
I adds credibility to the Chapter 11 analogy as a means of analyz-
ing the external debt crisis. This is especially so because the por-
tion of the court's opinion dealing with the Chapter 11 analysis
was not addressed in Allied Bank I and reversal was based on
other grounds.5
This Comment will begin with a detailed discussion and analy-
sis of the Allied Bank cases. It will provide the necessary back-
ground information about the external debt crisis and analyze the
competing economic and political interests that have shaped the
crisis. It will then discuss the inadequacies of the present renegoti-
ation procedure as illustrated by the Allied Bank cases. Finally,
this Comment will suggest some Chapter 11 principles that can be
used as guidelines in improving debt renegotiation procedures.
Many preventative measures can be taken to avoid the need
for, or lessen the extent of, external debt renegotiation.6 However,
this Comment will focus on the steps that should be taken in order
to avoid the ultimate crisis when these measures fail.
II. ALLIED BANK v. BANCO CREDITO AGRICOLA DE CARTAGO
A. Facts and District Court Decision
Allied Bank International (Allied) was the agent for a syndi-
cate of 39 banks.7 Defendants were three Costa Rican banks wholly
owned by the Republic of Costa Rica.' In 1976, pursuant to the
failure and reorganization of the Latin American Bank (LAB), the
5. Id.
6. See infra p.69 & note 55, p.79 & note 108.
7. The syndicate includes: American Fletcher National Bank, American Fletcher Bank
(Suisse) A.G., Atlantic International Bank, Banco Exterior de Espana, Banco de Madrid,
Bank of Miami, Intercontinental Bank of Miami Beach, Bank of Montreal, Bank of New
Orleans, Bank of Virginia International, Bayerische Vereinsbank Int'l, S.A., Bayerische Ver-
einsbank, A.G., Bremar Holdings Limited, Cleveland Trust Company, Columbia Union Na-
tional Bank, Credit Lyonnaise, Deutsche Bank A.G., Export-Import Bank of the United
States, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Fidelity National Bank of South Miami, Fidelity
Union Trust Company, First Commercial Bank of Taiwan, First National Bank of Fort
Worth, First National City Bank (Interamerica), First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., Hartford
National Bank, International Commercial Bank of China, Irving Inter-American Bank, Ir-
ving Trust Company, Kyowa Bank Limited, National Westminster Bank Ltd., Overseas In-
vestors Inc., The Royal Bank of Canada, The Sanwa Bank Limited, Equibank N.A., South-
east First National Bank of Miami, Stockholms Sparbank, and United California Bank.
8. Defendants were Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, Banco Anglo Costarricense, and
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica.
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defendants assumed the debts that LAB owed to the Allied syndi-
cate. LAB was chartered in the Cayman Islands but conducted
most of its business in Costa Rica. The defendants issued new
promissory notes to Allied totaling approximately $10 million. In
addition, they entered into side-letter agreements with Allied'
which called for repayment in semi-annual installments payable
from 1978 to 1983.
Although most of the negotiations took place in Costa Rica
and the Cayman Islands, payment was to be made in U.S. dollars
in New York City. The agreements called for concurrent jurisdic-
tion in New York and Costa Rica. 10 The agreements also provided
that failure of the Costa Rican Central Bank to supply the U.S.
currency necessary for repayment would excuse default for only
ten days.
The Costa Rican banks made payments on schedule until
1981, when Costa Rica found itself in serious economic trouble.
The nation did not have sufficient foreign currency to pay its inter-
national debts as they became due." Practically speaking, Costa
Rica was insolvent.12
In response to this crisis, the Costa Rican government issued
several decrees prohibiting all Costa Rican institutions from mak-
ing any payments of foreign currency to foreign creditors without
the approval of the Central Bank. The Central Bank informed the
defendants that they would not be permitted to pay the debts in
question until the country's entire external debt had been renego-
tiated. The President of Costa Rica cited the need for "harmony of
M~3decisions and centralization in the decision making process....
9. Copies of the side-letter agreements can be found at Brief for Defendant at 37-50,
105-18, 130-43 app., Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp.
1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant].
10. The location of the property (i.e., the debt) was a major issue in the original litiga-
tion. Allied argued that the situs was New York because the debt was payable there. The
Costa Rican Banks pointed to the fact that most of the negotiations took place outside of
the United States and asserted that the provision for payment in New York was merely an
incidental contact with the United States.
11. "Payments of long, medium, and short-term public debt in 1982 were expected to
use over 90% of projected export earnings." Brief for Appellee at 12, Allied Bank, 757 F.2d
516 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee] (quoting DEPT. OF STATE REPORT,
97TH CONG., 2D SEss., CoUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1981 393-94
(Comm. Print 1982)).
12. Insolvency is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "the condition of a person who is
unable to pay his debts as they fall due, or in the usual course of trade and business."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 716 (5th ed. 1979).
13. Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 11, (quoting Costa Rican Executive Decree
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Allied brought suit on behalf of itself and the 39 syndicate
banks in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. 14 The district court held, inter alia,5 that the act of
state doctrine" mandated recognition of the sovereign acts of
Costa Rica. The action was eventually dismissed. 7
B. Renegotiation of Costa Rica's External Debt
During the pendency of the district court case, negotiations
were being held between Costa Rica and National Trust and Sav-
ings Association (Bank of America)' 8 for the restructuring of Costa
Rica's entire external debt. On September 9, 1983, these two par-
ties signed a refinancing agreement (agreement) which required
the consent of the holders of at least 98 percent of Costa Rica's
external bank debt before it could become effective.' 9 Within two
weeks, 170 creditors had approved the refinancing agreement.
All commercial bank creditors were treated equally under the
refinancing agreement. Their interest payments were kept current
and their principal payments were stretched out into the 1990's. As
of June 1, 1984, Costa Rica had paid about $118 million in current
interest and about $400 million in past due interest.20
13103-H).
14. 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
15. The court rejected the argument that Costa Rica was entitled to sovereign immu-
nity because the execution of the promissory notes in question fell under the commercial
activity exception. Id. at 1443.
16. "The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this
country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized sovereign power
committed within its own territory." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
401 (1964). This definition merely scratches the surface of the doctrine. For a more exten-
sive discussion see Lengal, The Duty of Federal Court to Apply International Law: A Po-
lemical Analysis of the Act of State Doctrine, 1982 B.Y.U.L. REv. 61; Ac OF STATE AND
EXTRATERRITORAL REACH (J. Lacey ed. 1983).
17. In a case concerning the same Costa Rican decrees and almost identical facts, a
different judge in the same district held that the act of state doctrine did not bar recovery.
The rationale was that the situs of the debt was New York (see supra note 10) and that the
doctrine applies only to a taking of property by a foreign government within its own terri-
tory. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
18. Bank of America was the coordinating agent for all of Costa Rica's external private
creditors.
19. This is a typical requirement in this type of restructuring. Brief for Appellee, supra
note 11, at 15.
20. Id. However, the agreement required that large portions of these interest payments
be simultaneously loaned back to Costa Rica, which created an illusion of profits for the
banks. See discussion of banking aspects, infra pp. 71-73.
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Other classes of creditors were given preferential treatment.
The debts of "multilateral financing organizations," such as the
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, were not
rescheduled. Nevertheless, the negotiations were monitored by a
creditor committee which approved the terms of the restructuring
and assured that similarly situated creditors were treated equally.21
Fidelity Union Trust Company of New Jersey (Fidelity) was
the only one of the 39 banks in the Allied syndicate to reject the
refinancing agreement.2 Despite intense pressure from the larger
banks, Fidelity stood its ground. Allied, representing Fidelity
alone, took its case to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
C. The Court of Appeals Decision (Allied Bank I)
Faced with conflicting decisions in the same district court on
the applicability of the act of state doctrine,2 3 the court of appeals
entirely sidestepped the issue. Instead, the court ruled that comity
required the recognition of the Costa Rican actions.
In general terms, "comity. . . is the recognition which one na-
tion allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judi-
cial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens. ' 24 This
is hopefully a reciprocal recognition which applies "only if the acts
are consistent with the law and policy of the United States.' 25
Comity is generally considered to be broader and more discretion-
ary than the act of state doctrine.26
According to the circuit court, the two main requirements of
comity in this case were: 1) the consistency of the Costa Rican acts
21. Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 13-14.
22. Fidelity's Robert M. Craig gave the following reasons for the bank's refusal to ac-
cept the Refinancing Agreement: a) the debt to Fidelity had already been renegotiated once
in 1976, b) the restructuring required the extension of additional credit to Costa Rica, c) the
debt to Fidelity was originally to have been repaid by 1983, but the restructuring stretched
payments into the 1990's, and d) unlike most other banks in the Allied syndicate, Fidelity
had no other outstanding loans to Costa Rica. Appellant's Reply Brief at 18, Allied Bank,
757 F.2d 516 (2d. Cir. 1985). In addition, Fidelity's Vice Chairman, Kevin Shanley, had
hoped for a buy-out by the larger international lenders. See Sherrid, Semitough, FORBES,
July 30, 1984, at 134.
23. The court was faced with conflicting decisions in Allied Bank I and Libra on the
applicability of the act of state doctrine. See supra note 17.
24. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
25. Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714 slip op. at 7-8.
26. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-164.
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with U.S. foreign policy and 2) the consistency of those acts with
U.S. domestic jurisprudence. Regarding the first requirement, the
court cited the adamant support of Congress and the President for
both the Government of Costa Rica and the renegotiation itself. 7
In the opinion of the court, a ruling for Fidelity would have inter-
fered with vital U.S. foreign policy objectives. Perhaps the most
significant finding, however, was that the Costa Rican acts were
consistent with U.S. domestic jurisprudence as manifested in
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act.2" The court viewed "Costa
Rica's prohibition of payment of its external debts as being analo-
gous to the reorganization of a business" under U.S. law. 9 The
Costa Rican decrees were found to be similar to the automatic stay
of collection actions employed in Chapter 11 cases.3 0
D. Response to the Allied Bank I Decision
The appellate court's decision in Allied Bank I created a great
deal of unrest and uncertainty in international banking circles. Af-
ter all, the defendants admitted they were in default under the
terms of the loan agreement. Observers began to speculate whether
similar loan agreements would be enforceable in U.S. courts.3 1 Fi-
delity moved for rehearing with the support of amicus curiae briefs
from the New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA),32 the
Rule of Law Committee and the National Foreign Trade Council,
27. The U.S. government took part in the restructuring of Costa Rica's intergovern-
mental debt and signed a document recommending that private lenders follow suit. For a
discussion of creditor clubs, see infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. In addition, the
President has notified Congress that further economic aid to Costa Rica is vital to the na-
tional interest despite Costa Rica's failure to make timely repayment on previous loans. See
discussion of Foreign Assistance Act, Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 17-18.
28. It appears that in referring to the Costa Rican acts the court considered the entire
process, from the restrictive decrees of the Central Bank up to the actual renegotiation
agreements, as being part of the same act. But see Brief for Appellant at 16, Allied Bank
757 F.2d 516 (2d. Cir. 1985) (arguing that the court should consider only the original decrees
in determining their consistency with U.S. law).
29. Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714 slip op. at 5.
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1979).
31. See, e.g., New York Law Unsafe For Loan Agreements, The Financial Times
(London), May 24, 1984; Setting Latins Free, ECONOMIST (May 5, 1984), at 15.
32. The members of the N.Y.C.H.A. are: The Bank of New York, The Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, N.A., Citibank, N.A., Chemical Bank, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York,
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Irving Trust Co., Bankers Trust Co., Marine Midland
Bank, N.A., United States Trust Co. of New York, National Westminster Bank USA, and
European American Bank and Trust Co. Brief for N.Y.C.H.A. as amicus curiae, Allied
Bank, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for N.Y.C.H.A.].
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Inc. (RLC-NFTC),3 and the U.S. Department of Justice.
On rehearing, Allied's supporters attacked the court's ration-
ale on two basic points. First, they claimed the court misinter-
preted U.S. foreign policy. Second, they argued that there were sig-
nificant differences between this case and a true Chapter 11
reorganization which made the court's bankruptcy analogy
inappropriate.
The first line of attack was particularly persuasive in light of
the U.S. government's request for reversal. 4 The policy of the
United States is to support voluntary renegotiations of interna-
tional debts "within a context in which legal principles require en-
forcement of international loan agreements. Substantial alteration
of these legal principles changes expectations in a way that renders
contractual relations less certain, thereby discouraging needed fur-
ther lending."3 5
Other amici were concerned about the status of New York as a
center for international banking., They even suggested that the
appellate court decision might have affected all multinational busi-
nesses that extend credit to their customers. 7
The big banks argued that the court's decision had "undercut
the basic legal framework governing tens of billions of dollars of
credits extended in United States dollars and payable in New York
City . . ."38 Some bankers feared that the decision would "en-
courage debtor countries to rely on this case to obtain concessions
33. These two organizations joined in filing one brief. The Members of the R.L.C. are:
Atlantic Richfield Co., Bank of America, Bechtel Group, Inc., Bethlehem Steel Corp., Cater-
pillar Tractor Co., Chase Manhattan Bank, Chevron Corp., Exxon Corp., General Electric
Co., Gulf Oil Corp., and Texaco, Inc. The N.F.T.C. is a New York not-for-profit corporation
concerned with international trade and investment. Its 570 member firms account for over
70 percent of U.S. exports and over 70 percent of U.S. foreign direct private investment.
Brief for R.L.C.- N.F.T.C. as amicus curiae at 1, ALLIED BANK, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for R.L.C.-N.F.T.C.].
34. It is noteworthy that the U.S. government's brief, submitted by the Department of
Justice, was also signed by representatives of the Department of State, the Department of
the Treasury, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Brief for U.S.
Government, Allied Bank 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Brief for U.S.
Government].
35. Id. at 6-7.
36. "New York courts have consistently held that impossibility... of performance pro-
duced by foreign exchange control measures ... does not excuse the debtor's obligation to
perform." Brief for R.L.C.-N.F.T.C., supra note 32, at 13. See also, supra note 31; Setting
Latins Free, supra note 31.
37. See Brief for R.L.C.-N.F.T.C., supra note 33, at 2.
38. See Brief for N.Y.C.H.A., supra note 32, at 3.
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from their creditors . . ."9 Indeed, Argentine negotiators had al-
ready alluded to the decision in their talks with banks.40
In response to these formidable challenges, the Costa Rican
banks asserted that the appellate court decision was an extremely
narrow ruling, limited to the peculiar facts of the case. They
claimed that suggestions that the case could set a broad prece-
dent were based on "fears that someone in the future could mis-
read the decision.., to mean something that this court did not say
and defendants never argued."41
The Costa Rican banks also asserted that in spite of the U.S.
Government's position in the case, it was still significant that both
the President and Congress wholeheartedly supported the renego-
tiation process. 42 In addition, the Costa Rican banks argued that
recent international lending statistics did not support the sugges-
tion that the court's ruling would discourage further lending to
LDCs. 43
The second line of attack on the appellate court's rationale
was the asserted inappropriateness of the Chapter 11 analogy in
this context. The court relied on Canada Southern Railway Co. v.
Gebhard,44 in which the reorganization of an insolvent Canadian
corporation was given effect in a U.S. court. Gebhard, however, is
distinguishable on the grounds that the Costa Rican banks in this
case are not insolvent and there has been no foreign bankruptcy
proceeding. Furthermore, while the U.S. Bankruptcy Act4V 5 allows
the commencement of cases ancillary to foreign bankruptcy pro-
ceedings it does not apply to "bankrupt" sovereign nations.48
Allied also claimed that the Costa Rican decrees were discrim-
inatory because they applied only to debts owed to foreign credi-
tors, and not to those owed to Costa Rican creditors.47 The decrees
39. Brief for U.S. Government, supra note 34, at 7.
40. Sherrid, supra note 22, at 134.
41. Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 2.
42. See supra note 27.
43. In the few months following the Allied Bank I decision, between April and Septem-
ber of 1984, large loans were either made to or guaranteed by: Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Malay-
sia, Turkey, and Ireland. Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 24, (citing Weekly Fact Sheet,
Euromoney Syndication Guide (Euromoney Publications, Ltd. 1984)).
44. 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1979).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (12) (1979). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy 304 (15th
ed. 1984).
47. Brief for Appellant, supra note 28, at 4. Of course, if the Costa Rican nation is
viewed as the insolvent debtor because of its deficiency of foreign currency, then the distinc-
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also excepted multilateral financing organizations. In addition, nu-
merous procedural safeguards which are available to creditors
under Chapter 11 were not available to Fidelity in this case."
E. Reversal of the Allied Bank Decision on Rehearing (Al-
lied Bank II)
In March of 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed its original Allied Bank decision and remanded the case
for entry of summary judgment in favor of Allied Bank Interna-
tional. The court's decision was merely a restatement of the U.S.
Government's brief. 49 It emphasized the importance of maintaining
lender confidence in the legal validity and enforceability of inter-
national loan agreements. Any renegotiation, to be effective, must
be voluntary and bilateral.
The court stated frankly: "In light of the government's eluci-
dation of its position, we believe that our earlier interpretation of
United States policy was wrong. ' 50 The court had declared that
consistency of the foreign sovereign's acts with U.S. foreign policy
was a crucial factor,51 only to discover that its interpretation of the
President's policy was mistaken. Thus, reversal was almost
inevitable.52
The court considered the applicability of the act of state doc-
trine for the first time and found that it too was inapplicable. Be-
cause the doctrine applies only "when the taking is wholly accom-
plished within the foreign sovereign's territory,"53 the decision
tion between foreign and domestic creditors seems very logical.
48. See id. at 4. See also, infra p. 19 & note 102.
49. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
50. Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 520.
51. See supra notes 25 and 27 and accompanying text.
52. The court may have also considered the apparent subsidence of the debt crisis at
the time of the rehearing. In the orignial decision, the court may have seriously considered
the possibility that a successful suit by Fidelity could have disrupted the Costa Rican debt
restructuring. At the time of the rehearing, however, the renegotiation seemed to be more
firmly in place.
53. Allied Bank II, 757 F. 2d at 521. According to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the act of state doctrine applies only to a taking by a recognized government accom-
plished within its own territory. However, comity can still lead to the recognition of an
extraterritorial taking if it is consistent with the law and policy of the United States. See
supra note 25 and accompanying text. Thus, act of state appears to be more mechanical in
that it arises from the practical difficulties inherent in an attempt by U.S. courts to reach
across the borders of a sovereign nation. Decisions based on comity, however, are more vul-
nerable to variations and changes in U.S. foreign and economic policies. For a different view
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turned on the situs of the debt. The court found that the debt was
located in New York 4 and, therefore, the act of state doctrine did
not apply.
Nevertheless, the reversal of Allied Bank I does not end the
discussion raised by litigators and commentators alike. This case is
important not merely because of the immediate effect it will have
on the litigants, but because of the lessons which can be extracted
from it. First, the Allied Bank cases highlight the shortcomings of
the present system for dealing with the external debt crisis. More
importantly, the Second Circuit has added credibility to the Chap-
ter 11 analogy as a viable framework for improving the way banks
and governments deal with external debt problems.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Causes of External Debt Crisis
The present inability of many Latin American borrowers to
pay their international debts is a result of several interrelated fac-
tors, many of which have nothing to do with the countries' own
economic policies.55 Simply stated, the problem is that a combina-
tion of extremely high interest rates and a shortage of foreign cur-
rency has made it nearly impossible for many Latin American na-
tions to pay their debts.
A dramatic rise in interest rates since the mid-1970s is the
main cause of the external debt crises.56 Because the interest rates
on most international loans are tied to either the U.S. prime rate
or the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR),57 payments due
of the act of state doctrine, see Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doc-
trine in the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68
(1985).
54. 757 F.2d at 521.
55. For a thorough discussion of the history of the Latin American external debt prob-
lem, see generally, Comment, On Third World Debt, 25 HARv. INT'L L. J. 83 (1984); D.
DIMANCESCU, DEFERRED Fu'ruPE (1984); Note, Legal Aspects of the Latin American Exter-
nal Debt and its Ramifications for the Development and Integration of the Americas, 16
LAw. AM. 109 (1984); Mendez, Recent Trends in Commercial Bank Lending to LDC's: Part
of the Problem or Part of the Solution, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 173 (1982); Cohen,
U.S. Regulation of Bank Lending to LDC's: Balancing Bank Overexposure and Credit Sup-
ply, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 200 (1982).
56. The average interest rates charged by private lenders on middle and long term
loans to LDC's rose from under 8 percent in 1976 to over 14 percent in 1981. THE WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES XI (1983-84).
57. LIBOR is the rate at which banks in London offer Eurodollars in the placement
1985] .69
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
on such loans are now much higher than originally expected.58
The shortage of foreign currency for servicing these rising
debts is a result of two factors. First, the world-wide recession of
the late 1970's and early 1980's caused a sharp decline in both the
price and volume of Latin American exports.59 Second, the debt
crisis itself has made lending to Latin American borrowers more
risky, causing bankers to decrease the availability of credit to
Latin American nations.60 Thus, the two major sources of foreign
currency, exports and new loans, have been curtailed. This leaves
many nations with unexpectedly high interest payments and with
less foreign currency to make those payments.
B. IMF Stop-gap Measures
In response to this dilemma, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has implemented emergency programs to provide less devel-
oped countries (LDCs) with the credit they need to avoid default-
ing on their debts."1 An IMF bailout, however, does not come with-
out a heavy price.
In order to qualify for IMF credit, a country must agree to
impose severe austerity measures aimed at decreasing government
deficits and increasing trade surpluses.6 2 Nations that have agreed
to these measures, such as Mexico 6 have experienced some im-
provement in their debt situations, but at the cost of increased un-
employment and a scarcity of food and goods.6 4 Moreover, these
market. There is a different LIBOR rate for each deposit maturity.
58. For example, a 1 percent rise in interest rates would increase the current interest
debt of Brazil by over $700 million dollars and that of Chile by over $130 million dollars.
See WORLD DEBT TABLES, supra note 56 at 166, 170.
59. See WORLD BANK ANN. REP. 32 (1984).
60. See id. at 38.
61. One of the main functions of the IMF is to make the Fund's resources temporarily
available to troubled nations, "thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjust-
ments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or
international prosperity." Articles of Agreement of the I.M.F., July 28, 1968, art. I, para. v.
62. Such measures may include: Setting limits on imports, increasing exports, cutting
wages significantly, devaluating the nation's currency, increasing taxes, and cutting public
spending. See Smith, A Global Chapter 11?, FORBES, April 30, 1984, at 56.
63. See generally, Mercaldo, Mexico, One Country's Attempt at Dealing with the In-
ternational Liquidity Crisis, 3 Tim WORLD OF BANKING 9 (1984) (for a description of Mex-
ico's external debt restructuring).
64. By artificially increasing exports and decreasing imports, a government deprives its
people of access to domestic products and hurts domestic industry by hindering access to
foreign equipment and replacement parts. See D. DIMANCESCU, supra note 525 at 68. See
also Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1984, at 44, col. 6 (regarding the effects of external debt on food
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programs are merely stop-gap measures designed to put off major
defaults until economic conditions change and these nations are
better able to service their loans.
C. Banking Aspects
On the other side of this crisis are the banks in the wealthier
nations that loaned enormous amounts of money to Latin Ameri-
can borrowers and are now facing the possibility of unprecedented
defaults. The urge to lend was mainly sparked by large bank de-
posits made by the OPEC countries in the early 1970's.65
In general, U.S. banks have approached the problem in the
following manner: they accept the fact that they will not receive
any principal payments in the near future; they agree to put up
new loans to alleviate the liquidity problems; they require the bor-
rower nation to implement IMF austerity measures; and they re-
quire the borrower nation to service the debt by keeping interest
payments current and paying market rates.66
Bankers usually prefer this refinancing approach because it
keeps the desperate reality from being reflected in profit figures.67
From an accounting point of view it is business as usual, despite
the fact that as one commentator observed "the banks are paying
themselves."68
Banks have been receiving increased pressure to take mea-
sures that would more accurately reflect this delicate situation. 9
Federal regulators have suggested the creation of larger reserves to
imports).
Although Mexico's President de la Madrid was able to implement IMF austerity mea-
sures, leaders in less stable democracies may find it difficult to survive the political conse-
quences of these measures. The most obvious example is Argentina, where President Raul
Alfonsin is just beginning to establish the foundations of democracy in a country with little
democratic tradition. The economic ramifications of IMF austerity measures could threaten
Alfonsin's fragile political base. See Smith, supra note 62.
65. Banks were eager to lend large sums of money to Latin American countries in light
of the high rates of economic growth these nations were experiencing. From 1970 to 1979,
the average annual real rate of growth in total GNP for Latin America and the Caribbean
was 6 percent. However, this figure dropped to -1.4 in 1982 and was still lower in 1983.
WORLD BANK ANN. REP., supra note 59, at 150. This recession left most large U.S. banks
overexposed in the region.
66. Smith, supra note 62 (quoting Citibank Executive Vice President George J. Clark).
67. Only the interest portion of a debt is considered in calculating profits.
68. D. DIMANCESCU, supra note 55, at 135.
69. Agencies which have applied pressure on U.S. banks include the Federal Reserve
Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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protect against possible defaults on shaky Latin American loans.
European banks have already taken such a step, but the large U.S.
banks are reluctant to follow suit, because the reserves would have
to be taken out of their profits.70 It is unlikely that federal regula-
tors will impose high reserve requirements for loans to particular
LDCs because that would make it much more difficult for those
countries to obtain desperately needed new loans.
Commentators have suggested that the banks reduce the in-
terest rates on LDC loans regardless of the current market rates,
thereby alleviating the burden on Latin American borrowers. This,
however, would also have a significant effect on profits.7 1 In addi-
tion, bank accountants may be forced to declare loans nonperform-
ing to the extent of the forgiveness of interest debt. On the other
hand, there is the danger that a country's entire loan portfolio may
have to be declared nonperforming if alleviatory measures are not
taken. This situation has created a schism between the major
money-center banks and the smaller regional banks as to their
willingness to take such alleviatory measures. The simple reason
for this is that the money center banks have a much greater per-
centage of loans attributable to third world countries.
Any significant increase in loan reserves, or decrease in inter-
est payments, would devastate the book profits of some of the larg-
est American banks.72 A decrease in the interest rate payable by
major Latin American debtors to 6 percent would have reduced the
average 1984 profits of money center banks by as much as 35 per-
cent. 3 Almost all of the banks in the United States and Europe
that have either created substantial loan reserves or encouraged
lower interest payments have relatively little exposure in Latin
America.
Another important difference between money-center banks
and smaller regional banks is the fact that the smaller banks may
be less eager to go along with the restructuring of an LDC's exter-
nal debt. Having little LDC exposure, the smaller regional banks
have less to lose from a lawsuit and a better chance of attaching
70. An increase in reserves against loans to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela
equal to 1% of their face value would have cut 1984 profits of money center banks by an
average of 6%. Some European banks have raised reserves against LDC loans to well over
10% of face value, while the reserves of major U.S. banks remain at about I percent. Hector,
The True Face of Bank Earnings, FORTUNE. April 16, 1984, at 84.
71. See supra note 67.
72. See generally, Hector, supra note 70.
73. Id. at 86.
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enough of the debtor nation's assets to satisfy its relatively small
loan. The Allied Bank cases are an illustration of this situation.
IV. INADEQUACY OF PRESENT RENEGOTIATION PROCEDURE
A. Background of Present Procedure
External debt restructuring generally involves the formation
of "creditor clubs. '74 With the assistance of the IMF, creditor
clubs attempt to negotiate mutually acceptable refinancing terms
with debtor nations. 75 Typically, the first step taken by a finan-
cially distressed nation is to call on the IMF for short term assis-
tance.76 Such assistance is generally conditioned on an agreement
by the debtor nation to implement austerity measures aimed at
controlling its deficit. 7 If, as if often the case, the debtor nation
still requires a restructuring of its debt, the major creditor coun-
tries may organize a creditor club to carry out the negotiations.
The IMF continues to play an important role throughout the rene-
gotiation process. The creditor nations generally require that the
debtor nation implement an IMF austerity program as a condition
of refinancing. At the creditor club meeting, an IMF representative
usually reports on the cooperation and progress of the debtor in
that regard.78 The IMF may also act as an intermediary between
the parties. The Fund's access to financial information, "even if
the debtor nation regarded it as sensitive and was not publishing
it," 7 9 is vital to the renegotiation process.
B. Flaws in Present Procedure
The most obvious shortcoming of the creditor club system is
that it does not include private creditors.80 Generally, as in the
Costa Rican case, only official government creditors are party to
74. See, e.g., Paris Club, Agreed Minute on the Consolidation of the Debt of the Re-
public of Costa Rica, January 11, 1983. A copy may be found at Brief for Defendant, supra
note 9, at app. B.
75. For a discussion of the present renegotiation frame work, see Note, Procedural
Guidelines For Renegotiating LDC Debt: An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 305, 320-28 (1981); Comment, supra note 55.
76. But see, Mendez, supra note 55, at 176 (on increased role of private lenders).
77. See e.g., Paris Club, supra note 74, at § I, 2-4.
78. See id. at § I, T 3.
79. F. SOUTHARD, THE EvOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 2 (1979).
80. The uncertainty and limited scope of the creditor club system have led commenta-
tors to call for reforms. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 55; Note, supra note 75.
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the creditor club agreements. These agreements often contain pro-
visions recommending that the debtor nation reschedule its debt to
private lenders on similar terms and in an equitable fashion."
Debtor nations have voiced dissatisfaction with this renegotiation
format. One major complaint is that the negotiations focus on the
terms of repayment rather than on the long term political8 2 and
economic" goals of the debtor nations. It would be in the best in-
terests of both the LDCs and the banks to strive toward long-term
stability and productivity in the Third World. Debtor nations also
complain that the ad hoc nature of the creditor club process inhib-
its their ability to formulate effective economic policies.8 4 The ex-
clusion of private creditors from the process simply adds complex-
ity and uncertainty to the problem.
C. Inadequacy of Legal Remedy
The Allied Bank cases indicate the inadequacies in the ex-
isting renegotiation procedure. This is highlighted by the U.S.
Government's paradoxical position. 5 On the one hand, the Gov-
ernment recognizes that the renegotiation "necessitated broad sup-
port and that it was in the vital interest of all parties to cooper-
ate. ' 86 To achieve this end, the Government has put intense
pressure on banks to cooperate. On the other hand, it has come to
the aid of Fidelity because a successful renegotiation requires "a
context in which legal principles require enforcement of interna-
tional loan agreements. '87 Thus, the U.S. Government has put it-
self in a position whereby it supports a legal right that is meaning-
ful to the possessor only if no one else exercises it.
If, under circumstances analogous to those in Allied Bank, a
81. See, e.g., Paris Club, supra note 71, at § III, 1.
82. It is often suggested that by insisting on strict austerity measures, the banks and
the IMF ignore the tragic consequences this may have on the populace of debtor nations.
This, in turn, could destabilize the fragile democracies of Latin America. See, e.g., de Zeval-
los, Democracy in Peru Threatened by Terrorism and Debt, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1984, at
21, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1984, at A3, col. 2 (concerning reaction to austerity
measures).
83. See Riding, Clash of Views on Latin Plight, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1984, at D2, col.
1; Note, supra note 75, at 322.
84. See Note, supra note 75, at 322-23.
85. See supra notes 34 and 35 and accompanying text.
86. Brief for U.S. Government, supra note 34, at 8, n.4, (quoting J. de Larosiere, Man-
aging Director of the IMF, Remarks before the Institute of Foreign Bankers, May 2, 1984,
13 IMF SuRvEy 145, 146 (May 21, 1984)).
87. Brief for U.S. Government, supra note 34, at 6.
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substantial number of creditors sued to enforce their right to pay-
ment,88 there would not be nearly enough assets of the debtor
available to satisfy all claims. More importantly, there would be a
danger of a worldwide banking crisis. It is unlikely that the U.S.
Government would support the right of creditors to sue in such a
situation.
The inadequacy of a legal remedy for creditors in such a sce-
nario is evident from the events occurring subsequent to the Libra
decision. 9 Although the plaintiffs in Libra won a judgment against
Costa Rican banks, they were unable to attach enough assets to
satisfy the judgment.90 Eventually, the plaintiff banks voluntarily
relinquished the judgment and acquiesced to the Costa Rican
renegotiation. 91
An effort to attach the assets of a defaulting LDC could lead
to a disastrous chain of events. Because most external public loans
contain cross-default clauses,92 a lender could put all loans to a
particular country in technical default by declaring a relatively
small loan to be in default. The possibility of a loss of depositor
confidence in the banks would be very strong. A run on even one
bank could lead to a global crisis. "Should perceptions of any sin-
gle bank's fragility get out of hand because of overextended loans
to foreign borrowers, the vast interlocking network of financial in-
stitutions could face an unbridgeable liquidity crisis." 93 Bankers
are well aware of the similarities between the debt situation today
and the defaults of the depression era, when every Latin-American
country except Argentina and Haiti defaulted on its external
debt. 94
88. There are, of course, economic factors which deter the major banks from taking
such actions. See discussion of banking aspects, supra, pp. 71-73.
89. See supra note 17.
90. Although the outstanding balance in Libra exceeded $30 million, plaintiffs suc-
ceeded in attaching only $800,000 from Costa Rican bank accounts in New York City. There
is evidence that Costa Rica removed at least $2.5 million from U.S. bank accounts in order
to avoid attachment. 570 F. Supp. at 874-75.
91. Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 65.
92. A cross-default clause usually provides that the loan containing the clause shall be
in default if the borrower defaults on any of its other loans, including those from other
creditors. Mendez, supra note 55, at 193-94.
93. D. DIMANCESCU. supra note 55, at 127.
94. Id. at 141-2.
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D. Inadequacy of Presidential Action
Some commentators have noted that the President could in-
tervene by nullifying attachments of a country's assets and sus-
pending creditors' legal actions against a particular country as was
done during the Iranian hostage crisis.15 In Dames & Moore v. Re-
gan, 6 the Supreme Court upheld the President's actions during
the hostage crisis partially on the ground that they were specifi-
cally authorized by the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA).9 7 Nevertheless, there are serious flaws with a renego-
tiation procedure which relies on Presidential intervention as an
alternative solution.
In addition, the IEEPA can only be invoked when a national
emergency already exists.e8 In the context of the debt crisis, this
means that the President may have to wait until a major banking
crisis has already begun. His actions, therefore, would be ipso facto
futile. Moreover, if the President declares a national emergency for
IEEPA purposes before a major crisis actually occurs,99 then such a
declaration may unintentionally hasten a crisis by undermining the
public's confidence in the banks.
Presidential intervention under the IEEPA is simply not an
appropriate way to deal with the LDC debt problem. The potential
95. In order to facilitate negotiations with Iran, President Carter suspended all actions
of creditors against Iran and nullified all attachments of Iranian assets located in the United
States. See generally Swan, Reflections on Dames & Moore v. Regan and the Miami Con-
ference, 13 LAW. AM. 1 (1981) (for a more detailed discussion of the President's actions
during the hostage crisis).
96. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
97. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1978). The Court held that the nullifying of attachments was
specifically authorized by the I.E.E.P.A. The power to suspend claims, however, was gleaned
from the history of Congressional acquiescence in the President's settlement of claims of
U.S. nationals against foreign countries. See generally, 453 U.S. at 678-88.
98. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 provides:
a) Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may
be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President de-
clares a national emergency with respect to such a threat.
b) The authorities granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may
only be exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect
to which a national emergency has been declared for purposes of this chapter
and may not be exercised for any other purpose. Any exercise of such authorities
to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national
emergency which must be with respect to such threat.
99. For example, after a serious breakdown in negotiations with a debtor nation, but
before a major attempt by its creditors to attach its assets.
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consequences of the problem are too grave and there are too many
economic, political, and psychological uncertainties to rely on last
minute solutions.
V. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS
A. Formal Procedure Needed
Economic and political realities require a procedure for debt
renegotiation that is sensitive to both the financial security of
creditors and the long term economic health of debtor nations. An
analysis of the respective arguments of both parties in Allied Bank
suggests that it is possible to frame a procedure reflecting each
party's major objectives.
The Costa Rican banks' argument was that the Costa Rican
economy was in the midst of a serious crisis which necessitated the
restrictive actions of the Government. Rather than repudiating its
debts, Costa Rica insisted it was making a good faith effort to pay
them. By attempting to attach Costa Rican assets, defendants
claimed that Fidelity was attempting to obtain more favorable
treatment than other creditors, a result that may have hindered
the on-going renegotiation process.100 Recognizing their obligations
under the loan agreement, the defendants asserted that the ex-
treme facts of the case merited an exception.
Fidelity, on the other hand, claimed that a Costa Rican decree
could not suspend a debt payable in New York.101 In addition, Fi-
delity objected to the court's Chapter 11 analogy. It alleged that
the Costa Rican decrees were "enacted without notice to or consul-
tation with any creditors, ... proffered no plan ... nor any safe-
guards for the protection of the targeted creditors, ... contained
no time limit, . . .and . . . no procedures for creditors to be
heard. 10 2 Thus, Fidelity implied that the existence of a structured
procedure with Chapter 11-type safeguards would have mitigated
its objections to the Costa Rican actions.
These considerations point to the desirability of a formal rene-
gotiation procedure that resembles a domestic bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Although it is obvious that Chapter 11 cannot simply be
100. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 11, at 15; but compare Brief for Appellant,
supra note 28, at 17-18.
101. See supra note 10.
102. Brief for Appellant, supra note 28, at 4.
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internationalized in its entirety, its main goals and principles are
quite appropriate in the LDC debt context. Moreover, some useful
analogies to specific Chapter 11 provisions can also be made. 103
B. Guidelines For Procedure Based On Chapter 11
Principles
Any viable procedure should be based on the following princi-
ples: in order to avoid a major disruption of present international
banking practices, the procedure must only be initiated by nations
with severe economic difficulties as determined by a fairly objec-
tive formula; the procedure should be efficient and expeditious;
high priority should be placed on the long term economic growth
and political stability of the debtor nation; creditors should be
treated reasonably and equitably; and, ideally, there should be a
neutral international entity with the authority to supervise the ne-
gotiations and enforce these principles.
1. Initiation of Procedures
When the Costa Rican officials called the first meeting with
their country's commercial creditors in June, 1981, to ask for debt
relief, the atmosphere was one of distrust and confusion.10 4 The
Costa Ricans advised the lenders that they were experiencing a
critical currency shortage. The banks, however, were unwilling to
accept the asserted severity of the problem. They asked for de-
tailed economic data to confirm the situation, but the Costa Ricans
could not provide it. Serious negotiations were not resumed for
several months Costa Rica's credit deteriorated further and its cur-
rency shortage worsened.
The resulting delay and confusion in convincing creditors that
debts could not be paid as scheduled, served only to postpone the
remedy while the patient's illness steadily worsened. An effective
international renegotiation system would facilitate the availability
of economic data and utilize a fairly objective formula for ac-
cepting a debtor nation's petition. 05
The IMF is presently in the best position to provide detailed
103. See Note, supra note 75, at 332-38.
104. For a detailed account of these negotiations, see Step by Step Through the Costa
Rica Saga, EUROMONEY, August 1982, at 33.
105. Under Chapter 11, creditors may also file petitions. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1979).
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economic information concerning a debtor country's ability to pay
its foreign debt. Its access to confidential financial data makes it
ideal for this role.106
Chapter 11 does not require a specific showing of insolvency in
order for the debtor's petition to be accepted."0 7 In contrast, such a
showing is desirable in the external debt context. A lender's will-
ingness to provide crucial loans to LDCs is undermined if the
debtor nations initiate formal reorganization proceedings at the
slightest sign of financial trouble.
Creditors should be required to submit to a renegotiation pro-
cedure only upon a debtor nation's showing of "insolvency" as de-
termined by an objective formula. Such a formula could be based
on, inter alia, the ratio of a country's external debt to its export
earnings. 0 8
2. Procedure Should be Efficient and Expeditious
Another key factor of the procedure should be the avoidance
of delays that make economic planning by LDC governments more
difficult. An efficient and expeditious procedure would also benefit
creditors. Swift and effective renegotiation would heighten public
confidence in the financial stability of the banks. 09 The first and
most important step toward that end should be the inclusion of all
creditors, official and private, in one renegotiation process." 0 A
creditor's committee, such as that provided for in Chapter 11,1"
would be appropriate in this context. The committee could super-
vise and investigate the debtor's economic progress as well as re-
106. See F. SOUTHARD, supra note 79.
107. See ANDERSON, CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS § 3.02 (1983).
108. A similar formula has been suggested for limiting annual lending to particular
countries. Lending limitations would mitigate overexposure by banks in a particular country
or region but it would be unwelcome by LDCs in times of strong economic growth. See D.
DIMANCESCU, supra note 55, at 130. See also Cohen, supra note 55, at 225-35 (suggesting a
system of country exposure limits).
109. Nevertheless, efficiency must not be obtained at the cost of equity. U.S. bank-
ruptcy law recognizes that "the equity tradition complicates the struggle for efficiency."
NELSON, CORPORATIONS IN CRISIS 24-25 (1983).
110. See Note, supra note 72, at 329.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1979) requires the appointment of a creditors committee in
every Chapter 11 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (1979) provides that the seven creditors
with the largest unsecured claims will be on the committee if they so desire (secured credi-




present creditors in the formulation of a restructuring plan."'
A neutral study group, composed of experts in international
economics and banking, could also be formed to investigate the
debtor nation's financial situation and make suggestions to the
creditor's committee. Such a group was used with some success in
the Costa Rican renegotiation.11 s
3. Long-Term Focus of Renegotiation
New renegotiation guidelines should take into consideration
that it is in the best interests of all parties to have a productive
Third World. The importance of political stability in fragile de-
mocracies, especially those in Latin America, must be given high
priority when considering the imposition of strict austerity mea-
sures. "It is better, common sense has taught us over the centuries,
to have a productive member of a community than one punished
and banished from further social or economic intercourse. '114
LDCs have often complained that the terms of recent renego-
tiations focus too much on the creditor bank's short-term profits
and not enough on the long term health of the debtor nations.1 5
Chapter 11 recognizes the need for long-term solutions to debtor
problems by specifically requiring that a plan must propose long
range solutions in order to be confirmed.116
4. Fair and Equitable Treatment of Creditors
Perhaps the most important factors considered by U.S. bank-
ruptcy courts are that creditors in general be treated fairly and
that similarly situated creditors be treated similarly. Such consid-
erations are even more important in the international context
where there is a greater variety of interests involved.
112. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1979) for a description of the powers of the creditors
committee in Chapter 11 cases.
113. See EUROMONEY, supra note 104, at 40-45.
114. D. DIMANCESCU, supra note 55, at 16.
115. See Riding, supra note 83.
116. 27 U.S.C. § 1129 (1979) provides:
(a) The Court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements
are met: ...
(11) Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation,
or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to




In this regard, creditors could be classified according to the
nature and/or amount of their claims.117 Voting rules for approving
an agreement similar to those of Chapter 11, including class voting
rules, could also be adopted.1 8
Protection of a dissenting minority of creditors must be a key
function of a renegotiation system. Section 304 of the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code provides for the commencement of cases ancillary to
foreign bankruptcy proceedings." 9 It authorizes U.S. bankruptcy
courts to protect a foreign debtor's assets in this country against
creditor suits and attachments if, inter alia, such action is consis-
tent with "just treatment of all holders of claims against or inter-
ests in such estate; . . . protection of claimholders in the United
States against prejudice and inconvenience.. .;(and) prevention of
preferential or fraudulent dispositions of such estate.... ,o Al-
though this section does not apply to sovereign debtors, these prin-
ciples are equally appropriate in the sovereign debt context.
Appellants argued that the facts in Allied Bank were analo-
gous to a Chapter 11 "cramdown",' 2' but without the accompany-
ing "elaborate procedural safeguards to protect the interests of mi-
nority creditors.' 1 22 "Cramdown" refers to the procedure by which
a bankruptcy court may confirm a reorganization plan even though
it has been rejected by one or more impaired classes. 23 The court
may confirm the plan only if it "does not discriminate unfairly,
and is fair and equitable" with respect to each impaired class that
has rejected the plan. 24
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1979) provides that a claim may be placed in a particular class
only if it is "substantially similar" to the other claims in the class.
118. The present custom in external debt renegotiation is to require a higher degree of
creditor consent than is required by Chapter 11. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
But compare 11 U.S.C. § 126(c) (1979), which requires the consent of only two-thirds in
dollar amount of the claims in a class to constitute class approval. However, there is also a
requirement for the approval of a majority in number of creditors in a class.
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1979); see generally 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 304 (15th ed.
1984).
120. Id.
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1979).
122. Brief for U.S. Government, supra note 34, at 13, n. 9. The analogy to a
"cramdown" is questionable since the holders of over 98 percent of the claims accepted the
plan.
123. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1979) (for a definition of impairment).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1979). See generally Broude, Cramdown and Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAW 441 (1984); Klee, All You




The "fair and equitable" standard does not apply in Chapter
11 cases where all impaired classes accept the plan 2 5 (i.e., where
there are dissenting creditors in a class which accepts the plan).126
This distinction, however, need not be made in the international
context if deemed inappropriate. The "fair and equitable" stan-
dard could then be used even where there is only one dissenting
creditor.
Some type of international judicial entity would be the ideal
.mechanism to enforce this standard and the other general princi-
ples mentioned above. The U.S. Government's brief in Allied Bank
II noted that "no procedures exist to assure that minority creditors
could petition an impartial third party any time they considered




The ideal mechanism for the promotion of the previously dis-
cussed principles is an international tribunal. Dissenting creditors
or debtor nations complaining of particularly harsh renegotiation
terms could then bring their objections before the tribunal. Every
major creditor nation should participate in the creation of the tri-
bunal. Its function would be to either confirm the renegotiation
plan or require changes in it.
Although there are several existing international arbitration
formats,'2 1 an agreement creating a new format designed specifi-
cally for this purpose would avoid several problems. First, no major
Latin American debtor has signed the convention creating the In-
ternational Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
125. "Apparently the drafters intended that a Chapter 11 plan could discriminate un-
fairly among various classes of claims, so long as all classes vote in favor of the plan."
Broude, supra note 124 at 444.
126. This situation actually comes closer to describing the Allied Bank case than does
the cramdown analogy. Use of cramdown procedures are not common and would probably
entail a lesser degree of unanimity than the 98% vote in favor of the Costa Rican agreement
in Allied Bank. See id. at 441; 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
127. Brief for U.S. Government, supra note 34, at 14, n. 9.
128. For detailed discussion and analysis of the existing international arbitration for-
mats see WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1979); J.G.
MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 70-89 (1984); J. CHERIAN, INVESTMENT CON-
TRACTS AND ARBITRATION (1975).
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SID). 29 In addition, many LDCs have biases against the other ma-
jor arbitral organizations. 130  Second, the external debt
renegotiation process requires continuous oversight and investiga-
tion by experts in international finance and economics. Finally, it
would be easier to designate the desired substantive law guidelines
in a new specialized format created specifically for this situation.
An arbitral tribunal could be formed under the auspices of the
IMF, 3' thus keeping a close link between the information gather-
ing mechanism and the enforcement mechanism. Nevertheless, the
tribunal should have complete autonomy in the decision making
process. The administration of ICSID and its relationship to the
World Bank could be a useful guide. 32
The selection of arbitrators is a very important step. It deter-
mines the amount of trust the parties will have in the tribunal. In
the typical tribunal, both sides appoint an equal number of arbi-
trators who then select the remaining "neutral" arbitrators. 33 It
would be more efficient to appoint a pool of permanent arbitra-
tors 34 than to select members on a case by case basis. Each side
could be allowed to select one-third of the arbitrators who will pre-
side over their case from the pool. This process would minimize
the parties' objections concerning the biases of arbitrators. These
arbitrators could then select the remaining one-third. Although
permanent arbitrators could be named in the initial agreement, it
would be better to establish a procedure for their selection. A simi-
lar procedure was utilized in the creation of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. 35
Arbitration, whether between states or individuals, is contrac-
tual in nature. 136 A consensual agreement between debtor and
129. See 17 LC.S.I.D. ANN. REP. 6-7 (1982-83).
130. See J. CHERIAN, supra note 128, at 47-62.
131. This is wholly consistent with the purposes of the IMF. See Articles of Agreement
of the IMF, supra note 61, art. L
132. See generally J. CHERIAN, supra note 128, at 65-74; SZASZ, The Investment Dis-
pute Convention Opportunities and Pitfalls, V J.L. & ECON. DEv. 1 (1970).
133. See, e.g., J.G. MERRILLS, supra note 128, at 73; Declaration of the Government of
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, January 19, 1981, art. III, para. 1, 1 IAN-U.S. C.T.R. 7 (1981-82) [hereinafter
cited as Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Agreement].
134. See Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Agreement, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. See WETR, supra note 128, at Vol. I, 5.
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creditor nations1 7 whereby the parties submit to permanent juris-
diction is preferable to determining jurisdiction on a case by case
basis. Such an agreement would be easier to obtain by setting nar-
row and clearly defined limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of
the tribunal and on the substantive law which it must apply. The
subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal' 38 should be limited to
questions regarding the legitimacy of the debtor's asserted need for
renegotiation, 39 questions having a direct bearing on the confirma-
tion of the particular plan, and questions referred to the tribunal
by the parties. 40
Choice of law questions frequently cause significant disagree-
ment in international arbitrations. Tribunals often look to interna-
tional law or equity as a basis for their decisions.' 4 ' In the external
debt context, however, the applicable substantive law must be lim-
ited to clearly defined principles such as the bankruptcy reorgani-
zation principles discussed in this Comment.
Framing the substantive law guidelines of a tribunal with ref-
erence to U.S. bankruptcy law would be consistent with the fact
that "reference to municipal law is ... particularly common" in
international commercial arbitration. 142 Perhaps it would be more
practical, however, to borrow guidelines from the bankruptcy laws
of the various nations involved. In either case, the substantive law
guidelines should be spelled out in the charter of the tribunal, lim-
iting the interpretive powers of the arbitrators as much as is
practicable.
The degree to which an arbitral decision binds the parties is
determined mainly by the terms of the agreement, but partly by
general principles of international law. Each party generally agrees
to be bound by the decision, as long as it is within the tribunal's
jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, "there is no way.., of getting finality by action
of the arbitrators.' ' 43 Courts can deny effect to an arbitral award
137. Jurisdiction over private creditors is discussed infra at pp. 26-28.
138. For a discussion of jurisdiction in international arbitration see Was'ra, supra note
128, at Vol. II, 287-92; J.G. MERRILLS, supra note 128, at 76.
139. The tribunal should have the authority to decide if the requirements for initiating
the formal renegotiation procedure has been met. See supra note 105 and accompanying
text.
140. See J.G. MERRiLLS, supra note 128, at 77.
141. See WETTER, supra note 128, at Vol. II, 298-99.
142. J.G. MERRILLS, supra note 128, at 79.
143. Statement of Dean Soia Mentschikoff regarding the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
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if, inter alia,'" the tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction or violates
some fundamental principle of judicial procedure.14 5 This poses the
constant threat that a resourceful party can challenge almost any
arbitral award.
B. Role of U.S. Courts
1. If Tribunal is Created
It will likely be easier to obtain consent for binding arbitration
from the nations involved than from private creditors. It is there-
fore necessary to examine the role U.S. courts must assume when a
private creditor chooses to sue in a U.S. court rather than abide by
a renegotiation plan that has been confirmed by the tribunal.
If the dissenting creditor has submitted itself to the arbitra-
tion and lost, then it is bound by the decision and the court can
generally give no relief. The creditor's only remedy would be to
challenge the decision as a nullity. On the other hand, if the dis-
senting creditor sues without first submitting to arbitration, the le-
gal implications are very different. The President could agree, by
prior agreement or treaty, to suspend creditors' claims against a
particular country upon the initiation of the arbitration proce-
dure. 1 46 Dissenting creditors would thereby be induced to seek re-
lief from the tribunal. Relief could then be obtained by showing
that the renegotiation agreement treated the creditors prejudicially
or unreasonably. 147
The question of presidential power arises when such action is
initiated by executive agreement. The argument could be made
that, as in the Iranian hostage situation, creditors have been pro-
vided with "an alternative forum.., which is capable of providing
meaningful relief.'14 8 It should be noted, however, that the Dames
& Moore Court expressly refused to rule that the President has a
plenary power to settle claims, even those against foreign govern-
Transcript of the Conference on the Settlement with Iran Held at the University of Miami
School of Law, 13 LAw. AM. 1, 39 (1981). This statement refers to the doctrine of nullity. For
more information, see generally WETTER, supra note 128, at Vol. III, 187-214; J.G. MERRMLLS,
supra note 128, at 84; REISMAN, NuLLrrY AND REVISION (1971).
144. See WETTER, supra note 128.
145. See J.G. MERRILLS, supra note 128, at 84-86.
146. See discussion of initiation of renegotiation procedure, supra pp. 78-79.
147. See supra pp. 80-81.
148. 453 U.S. at 687.
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ments. 149 If suspension of claims is agreed to by a treaty and is
approved by the Senate, then the question of presidential author-
ity does not arise.150
The other creditor nations would have to use similar methods,
in accordance with their own laws, to preclude their courts from
adjudicating a case which has been accepted by the international
tribunal. To ensure equitable treatment of creditors, all creditors
must be denied the traditional legal remedies.
2. If Tribunal is not Created
Until a formal renegotiation procedure is created, U.S. courts
have three alternative ways of dealing with cases such as Allied
Bank. First, they can simply rely on the doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda'5' and allow creditors to attach the assets of the debtor
in an attempt to satisfy the debt. This was the result in Allied
Bank II. The practical and political problems of such an inflexible
approach have already been addressed. 2 Second, the courts can
refuse to scrutinize the acts of the foreign nation as was done in
AlliedBank L153 However, this gives Chapter 11-type protection to
the debtor without providing corresponding safeguards to the cred-
itors. 5 4 If deference is given to the acts of other nations because
they are consistent with U.S. law as manifested in Chapter 11,
then the court should go a step further and inquire into the treat-
ment of the dissenting creditor.
149. Id. at 688.
150. Dames & Moore dealt only with Executive actions. Nevertheless, even under a
treaty such suspensions may run afoul of the taking clause of the fifth amendment. U.S.
CONsT. amend. V.
Dames & Moore did not decide whether the suspension of claims constituted a "taking"
because of lack of ripeness. 453 U.S. at 688, n. 14. However, the Court did rule that petition-
ers could bring an action in the United States Court of Claims under the Tucker Act. 28
U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. III 1979).
151. Pacta sunt servanda is the policy which dictates that contracts and treaties should
be binding on the parties and courts should give effect to the reasonable expectations that
arise from such agreements.
152. See supra pp. 78-79.
153. Note that the result in Allied Bank 11 depends on U.S. foreign and economic poli-
cies, which are subject to change and interpretation. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text. Thus, Allied Bank II could be cited in a future case to support an opposite result. For
example, if a case were to arise under circumstances which indicated a strong possibility of a
run on a country's assets, a court may find that in that particular case U.S. policy would
support the debtor nation.
154. See objections of Fidelity, supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Because consistency with U.S. law is one of the requirements
for respecting an extraterritorial taking, a dissenting creditor such
as Fidelity should have a remedy if it can show that it was
prejudiced in a way that made the renegotiation inconsistent with
Chapter 11 principles. If after such an inquiry it is found that the
creditor was treated properly, then there would be a stronger basis
for respecting the foreign sovereign's actions.
This points to the third, and previously unexplored, judicial
alternative in an Allied Bank scenario. The courts could allow a
foreign debtor to proffer the acts of its government as a defense
under circumstances similar to those in Allied Bank. The courts,
however, could frame the characteristics and conditions of the de-
fense in a manner which incorporates the Chapter 11-type policies
previously discussed. This would require that the courts conduct
extensive inquiry into the handling of the renegotiation process in
each case. Essentially, federal courts would perform functions simi-
lar to some of those performed by bankruptcy courts in the domes-
tic context.
As a starting point, the courts should require a showing of
"national insolvency" before the defense can be asserted. Courts
could establish specific standards, perhaps even a formula,155 to as-
sist in this initial determination.
Once the defense is allowed, the courts could set conditions
and limitations on its use to ensure consistency with Chapter 11-
type principles. Rather than allow an absolute defense to a creditor
suit as was done in Allied Bank I, the court would retain jurisdic-
tion until the renegotiation is completed. The defense would be
subject to attack by dissenting creditors if, at any time during the
renegotiation, the conditions of the defense are breached. Thus,
the creditor in an Allied Bank situation is precluded from ob-
taining a legal remedy unless it can show that it was treated in a
manner that violates Chapter 11 principles. For example, a credi-
tor should have a remedy if it can show unfair or discriminatory
treatment.
156
There is authority to support the creation of such a body of
law by the federal courts. Although there is no "federal general
155. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
156. See supra pp. 80-81 (for a discussion of Chapter 11 standards for protecting credi-
tors). In particular, see the discussion of the standards under Section 304, supra notes 119
and 120, and accompanying text.
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common law," 15' it is widely recognized that there exist areas of
"special" federal common law. 158 One of the most important areas
in which federal common law is applied is in those cases dealing
with international issues. 159
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 60 the Supreme
Court invoked the act of state doctrine in refusing to inquire into
the validity of a seizure by the Cuban Government of assets in
Cuba owned by U.S. citizens. In so doing, the Court recognized
that "[p]rinciples formulated by federal judicial law have been
thought by this Court to be necessary to protect uniquely federal
interests."' 6'
In essence, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Al-
lied Bank I, was espousing federal common law when it cited
Chapter 11 to support its decision. Federal courts could go a step
further and create a body of law that more accurately reflects
Chapter 11 principles.
There are significant limitations, however, to this type of judi-
cial solution. A crucial aspect of Chapter 11 law is that all creditors
are bound by the decisions of the bankruptcy court. In the external
debt context, however, it would be very difficult for a U.S. court to
join all of a debtor nation's creditors in one action.'62 These credi-
tors are usually dispersed throughout the globe and it would be
impossible to obtain jurisdiction over all of them. Even if it where
possible to do so, each separate loan transaction would require a
different choice of law determination. In addition, it would be diffi-
cult for courts of one nation to affect the legal status of a debtor's
assets located in another nation. 63
Accordingly, an active role by U.S. courts would involve a
piecemeal solution and could only be partially effective. Neverthe-
less, it may be preferable in some cases to use an Allied Bank I
157. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
158. See generally WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTs 387-97(4th ed. 1983).
159. See JEssuP, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International
Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939).
160. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
161. Id. at 426.
162. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (1981).
163. There were similar jurisdictional problems during the early stages of American
bankruptcy law. "The main inadequacy of the state insolvency laws... was the inability to
give a discharge which would be effective in other states." 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy 0.03




type of rationale than to mechanically apply pacta sunt servanda
without considering economic and political realities.
In the ultimate analysis, a solution on the international level is
needed. It is noteworthy, however, that a large part of U.S. bank-
ruptcy law was originally common law doctrine, formulated by
courts long before it was embodied into statutes. Similarly, a fed-
eral judicial body of law could be the predecessor of, and lay the
groundwork for, an international solution of the type suggested in
this Comment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The international debt crisis is presently one of the most sig-
nificant threats to the economic welfare of the world and, ulti-
mately, to world peace. Every person from Sao Paulo to Tokyo to
New York would be affected by a "worst case" scenario. Executives
of the world's largest financial institutions are far more worried
about the vulnerability of the international banking system than
they can publicly acknowledge.
Aside from the possibility of disastrous defaults, the manner
in which banks and governments attempt to deal with the ongoing
debt crisis may influence economic and political events in many
significant ways. In debtor countries, the economic effects of aus-
terity provide fertile soil for the birth of political upheaval. On the
other hand, failure by LDCs to take serious steps toward economic
self-discipline would discourage further lending, and thereby crip-
ple their economies. Somewhere between these equally undesirable
alternatives lies the desired balance. The ultimate question is
whether that precarious balance can be long maintained by an ad
hoc renegotiation process dominated mainly by self-interested
parties.
It is unclear whether the major hurdles of the most recent cri-
sis have been overcome through this ad hoc process. Nevertheless,
as is the case with all types of refinancing, it is impossible to know
whether the day of reckoning has been completely avoided or
merely deferred.1 64 Moreover, the general problems of Third World
164. The World Bank now predicts that developing countries are entering another criti-
cal stage of the ongoing debt crisis. Approximately two-thirds of Third World debt will
come due within the next five years. World Bank President, A.W. Clausen, recently stated
that "[i]n the next five years about 60% of the debt of the developing countries will need to
be rolled over or amortized." Seaberry, Debt Crisis Takes Turn for Worse, The Miami Her-
1985]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
debt will continue as long as there are less developed countries in
need of outside financing to support their efforts to become devel-
oped countries. Thus, the need for restructuring LDC debt from
time to time, as nations move from periods of growth to periods of
recession, is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.
In the domestic setting, the Chapter 11 framework has been
successful in balancing the interests of debtors and creditors whose
goals are very similar to those of their counterparts in the interna-
tional context. The most important feature of the Chapter 11
scheme is that it seeks to restore the debtor to a position of eco-
nomic productivity. It imposes the need for broad, long term con-
siderations upon creditors in a situation where their natural in-
stincts would otherwise lead them to think in terms of narrow,
short term solutions.
Although the task would be difficult, it is possible to create an
international entity to enforce Chapter 11-type principles in cases
of extreme external debt difficulties. The Second Circuit's decision
in Allied Bank I lends support to the need for such a system. In
addition, both the U.S. Government and U.S. banks have cited the
lack of Chapter 11-type safeguards as one of their main objections
to the Allied Bank I result. In the absence of such a system, fed-
eral courts should give effect to sovereign debt moratoria when exi-
gencies require it and when doing so would be consistent with
Chapter 11 principles.
History has taught us that unfettered economic interaction be-
tween self-interested parties does not always lead to the enhance-
ment of the public welfare. Because the fortunes of the players in
the international setting are so interrelated and the consequences
of failureso staggering, there is a greater need for cooperative ac-
tion now than there ever was in the domestic area. It is time to
initiate a formal procedure for external debt renegotiation that will
help find solutions to the debt crisis and, at the same time, ensure
that the solutions to today's economic crises do not become the
causes of tomorrow's political crises.
Ruben Sklar
ald, July 5, 1985, at 4B, col. 6.
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